How long can the international nuclear order survive? There is good reason to be pessimistic about both the fate of that order and what comes next. But we should not be fatalistic: US leadership can still make a difference. Its stake in nuclear order is compelling enough to sustain a leadership role.
What Is the International Nuclear Order?
The international nuclear order was the first major offshoot of the global political order put in place after World War II. That political order prized the right to national self-determination, human rights, an open international trading system, self-defense and collective security, and a rules-based approach governing competition. It was built on the foundation of a stable balance of power and peaceful coexistence among ideologically and militarily competitive rivals. The international nuclear order that came together in the 1950s and 1960s would not have been possible without these attributes of the political order.
Of course there is no agreed definition of the international nuclear order. Some experts associate this order with the web of nuclear-relevant international treaties for nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament and their associated implementation mechanisms and the associated norms against nuclear weapons. Others associate this order with the distribution of existing capabilities in the international system. It is better thought of as both.
An Order in Peril
The international nuclear order is in peril, largely due to erosion of the global political order. Relations among the major powers are increasingly adversarial, international norms are increasingly contested, the US leadership role is increasingly uncertain, and alignments and political preferences are reforming around new expectations. Opponents of the existing order, led by Moscow and Beijing, seek a world with much-diminished US influence and built on values different from the post-World War II liberal international order. They do not seek sovereignty for their neighbors; they seek deference from them. They seek the freedom to change borders by force. The diplomacy of collective security has largely collapsed under the pressures of major power rivalry, as Russia and China seek to use the United Nations system to obstruct American influence and redistribute power in their favor. In Vladimir Putin’s infamous words from 2014, he seeks “new rules or no rules.”
At the same time, the Western world has become less committed to that order and those rules and the United States has become less committed to its traditional leadership role. Moreover, stability among the nuclear forces of the United States, Russia, and China is slowly but steadily giving way to a much more unpredictable and dangerous situation as a result of a new tripolar offense-defense arms race and the rising risks of nuclear coercion and escalation in war.
To be sure, the global political order has not fully collapsed. But it has contracted, as fewer states accept the legacy rules as legitimate. And it is much more contested than before, as more states seek norm-setting roles.
All of this translates into trouble for the international nuclear. The resulting situation is both fragile and volatile, as is evident in many ways. The major powers no longer cooperate as successfully as they once did to safeguard the international legal regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the system for coordinating export controls, and security guarantees. And the balance of nuclear power among them has entered a newly competitive phase with rising concerns about the likelihood of armed confrontation and nuclear escalation.
A key and newly fragile part of that order relates to the US practice of extended nuclear deterrence. This is the practice of providing US nuclear protection to allies and partners. This practice has been essential for both achieving nonproliferation goals and securing the safety of US allies and the stability of the regions in which they live, thus making America safer. But the practice is under growing duress. Threats to allies in both Europe and Asia are growing, along with threats to the US homeland. Moreover, doubts about the political resolve of the United States to defend these allies, especially when presented with new nuclear threats, have resurged.
A tipping point may soon be reached at which one or more allies, in one or more regions, cross the nuclear threshold, resulting in a sudden cascade of proliferation among US allies and more generally. This would inevitably result in the collapse of the nonproliferation regime and a dramatic growth in the risk of nuclear conflict and of the diversion of nuclear materials and technologies and possibly weapons to non-state actors.
Another critical factor is renewed US reliance on counterproliferation strikes to enforce the nonproliferation norm. On the one hand, these strikes have demonstrated the capacity of the United States to use military force to enforce the nonproliferation norm. On the other hand, they illuminate the failure of nonproliferation diplomacy and the division of the world into those who bomb and those who are bombed, further eroding the international political order. Moreover, it remains unclear whether they will prove effective in the long run. Tehran may choose to cross the nuclear threshold decisively. If it does so, others will follow.
With skillful diplomacy and luck, a contracting and contested global political order may long survive. But the international nuclear order may not long survive a contracting and contested global political order, especially when a falling out among the major powers is at the core of the international political problem. Is collapse imminent? The case that it is not follows from the observation that the regime has proven durable through decades of volatility and difficulty because, at the end of the day and whatever their grievances, all states are better off in the regime than having witnessed its collapse. The case that it is follows from the paralysis of the UN Security Council, Russia’s aid to proliferators, and the disaffection of leading members of the Global South. A better case can be made that its collapse is already underway with the hollowing out of institutions, norms, and expectations.
What Comes Next?
Plausible successors to the current international nuclear order are not numerous. Is a replacement order possible? Some imagine a pathway forward linked to implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This imagined pathway envisions the rejection of extended nuclear deterrence by US allies, followed by the rejection of nuclear weapons by the democracies more generally, followed finally by disarmament by authoritarian states “under the weight of international pressure.” The disarmament history of the 1930s illuminates the folly and danger of this vision.
If a replacement order is not possible, the plausible successors to the current international nuclear order are all more disorderly than the present order, not less so. The alternatives range from the merely chaotic to the catastrophic. The worst case would be a rapid descent into nuclear conflict and the normalization of nuclear weapons as instruments of war fighting. But this is another imagined future that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. Regular repeats of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be “normalized.” This leaves the “merely chaotic” option. This would be a world of many nuclear uncertainties and heightened nuclear dangers, amidst a scramble to not be left behind in the rush for a nuclear deterrent for life in the nuclear jungle.
At a time of growing doubt about the US leadership role, it is appropriate and useful to ask what forms of leadership might and can be expected of others. China might be willing to step into some of the roles that the United States might no longer play; but its policy agenda would likely diverge sharply from US preferences. For example, it is already well focused on undermining US extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. States in the Global South might be able to exercise more constructive influence than heretofore; but many appear already committed to the principles of the TPNW. Leadership might also be exercised by individuals and organizations outside the governmental realm—self-described “norm entrepreneurs.”
But the United States has too much at stake to cede leadership to others or, worse, to stand by idly while the order collapses. The international nuclear order is largely a US creation, designed to safeguard broad international interests (in reaping the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and escaping the potential catastrophe of nuclear war) while also advancing the self-interests of the United States. Those interests include the avoidance of nuclear wars, freedom from nuclear coercion for itself and its allies and partners, positive control of highly sensitive materials and technologies, the peaceful application of those materials and technologies, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
First Principles
In these perilous times, US policy should be guided by the following principles.
First, avoid unforced errors. Don’t abandon the project. Don’t cede leadership to others. Don’t reward bad behavior. Do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good enough.
Second, shore up the ordering institutions. Give them the political and other resources they need.
Third, tend to the requirements of a stable nuclear balance of power with a more robust extended nuclear deterrent and a central strategic deterrent tailored to the two-peer challenge.
Fourth, don’t give up on engagement with Moscow and Beijing. Keep near-term expectations low and think of this as a long-term project. In current circumstances, Putin and Xi Jinping want the United States and its allies to worry about nuclear risk. They’re also more confident in running more of their own nuclear risks. But this does not mean that they would welcome the catastrophic failure of the international nuclear order and the rise of new and direct nuclear threats to Russia and China that would come with it. Thus, a foundation for cooperation with them and/or their successors remains and can be rediscovered politically, in due course.