From the Archives | The United States’ Position in Africa

On Solid Ground or Shifting Sand?

By Amb. Charles A. Ray

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, sent  shock waves around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa.  There the invasion exposed fissures in the US relationship with  countries on the continent, exacerbated food insecurity, and called into  question the commitment to democracy of some of them. The first sign of distance between African nations and the West came  during a March 2, 2022, UN General Assembly (UNGA) emergency session  to vote on a resolution [1] to condemn the Russian invasion. Only 24 of 54 African countries represented in the UN voted in favor of the resolution,  while 17 abstained, including Algeria, Angola, and South Africa. Eight  countries did not vote, and one, Eritrea, joined Belarus, Russia, North Korea,  and Syria in voting against the resolution. When UNGA met again on  February 24, 2023, and called for Russia’s immediate withdrawal from  Ukraine and an end to fighting, 15 African countries, again including  Algeria, Angola, and South Africa, abstained, while two, Eritrea and Mali,  were among the seven voting with Russia against it.[2] 

Western nations were disappointed at the lukewarm support for  isolating Russia over the Ukraine invasion.[3] This situation comes at a time  when the rivalry for Africa’s natural resources, trade, and security  relationships is at an all-time high—especially with the West versus China  and Russia. The African Union (AU) issued an unequivocal call for Russia  to “respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine” when the invasion began, but on subsequent UN votes, such as the vote to  suspend Russia from the UN human rights body, nine African nations voted  against it, 23 abstained, and 11 did not vote. Only 11 voted for the measure. 

Reasons for the “African” Position(s) on Russia-Ukraine are Varied 

An analysis of African nations’ positions vis-à-vis Russia is not a  simple undertaking. The 50-plus nations on the African continent have more  than 50 different historical and contemporary motives for their actions  regarding Russia and China. 

Russia’s war in Ukraine comes at a time of intense competition  among the West, China, and Russia for Africa’s resources, trade, and  security relationships. While the diverse opinions in Africa regarding Russia  and the conflict might be confusing to us, there are several reasons for this  divided stance. 

Several countries have compelling reasons for siding with the US and the West. Kenya seeks a security partnership with the United States  against Islamist militants coming from Somalia; Nigeria wants support against Islamic State and Boko Haram, and Ghana seeks closer cultural ties  with the United States by becoming the main slave heritage tourism  destination. 

The countries that don’t unequivocally side with the West—South  Africa, Eritrea, and Central African Republic, for example— do not want to  jeopardize trade and security ties with Russia. South Africa, in addition, tries  to follow a non-aligned policy, which at times appears “pro-Russian” to the  West.  

Many African countries maintain a long-simmering resentment  about being treated as pawns in the super-power struggles. This resentment  was present long before the invasion of Ukraine. It just took the Russian  invasion to cause tensions to bubble up. 

More recent events also exacerbate the rifts between the United  States and Africa.[4] A senior African diplomat, quoted in a Reuters article on April 13, 2023, said, “It’s a feeling that we are where superpowers practice  their games. How we experience it doesn’t matter to them. What they care  about is their power.” 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, pleas to the rich nations for  vaccines were ignored. The same seems to be happening to Africa’s funding  request to cope with climate change, which has hit the continent harder than  most other populated continents. Many Africans believe that when Africans  have a problem, it’s an African problem, but when there is an international  problem, as defined by the West, it’s a global problem. African leaders also  resent, what they consider, Western moralizing and criticism in their  conditionalities for assistance, something the Russians and Chinese don’t do. 

Consider US relations with Uganda.[5] In 1987, one year after taking  power in Uganda, Yoweri Museveni visited the White House. President  Ronald Reagan greeted him with: “I know your concern and progress you’re  making with regard to human rights.” This meeting began a decades long  relationship based mostly on security ties and military cooperation. At first,  it was to battle the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels operating in northern  Uganda. Museveni partnered with the United States to fight terrorism in the  Horn of Africa. At one time, they deployed more than 6,200 Ugandan troops  to the AU mission in Somalia which was battling the al Qaeda-linked group  al-Shabab. In addition, Ugandans have served as security guards on US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.[6]

Election violence in 2021, in which dozens of people were killed and  the main opposition candidate placed under house arrest, prompted the  United States to take a serious look at its relationship with Museveni. Once  a steadfast US partner helping to maintain peace in East and Central,  Museveni is now considered a brutal dictator who is violating the rights of  his citizens and subverting democracy. As justified as this change might be,  it affects the attitudes of African leaders—in particular autocratic leaders— on whether to support our international initiatives.

Post-Cold War Detachment and Disenchantment 

The US relationship with Africa, both the countries in North Africa  and sub-Saharan Africa, dates back centuries. However, most American  diplomacy was conducted through the European colonizers, except for  Liberia, Ethiopia, and Morocco. After World War II, when African countries began to gain their independence and the advent of the Cold War, US interest increased. [7] The United States and the Soviet Union competed  vigorously to bring the newly independent countries into their respective  spheres of influence. After the Cold War and the Soviet Union breakup, US interest in  Africa again flagged until the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Then the US priorities  in Africa shifted from fighting communism to the Global War on Terror.  During the period between the Cold War ending and the focus on fighting  Islamic extremist groups, the countries of Africa—once avidly courted by  Washington and Moscow with millions of dollars in economic aid and  armaments—found themselves devalued. The interest caused by the  superpower rivalry was replaced with international indifference.[8]

In the Horn of Africa, for instance, the remnants of the Cold War  rivalry are starkly displayed. In 1977, formerly pro-US Ethiopia cast its lot  with the Soviet Union and was rewarded with Cuban troops and billions of  dollars’ worth of military equipment. The US response was to pump arms  and money into neighboring Somalia, a country of mostly desert with a  population of six million nomads. Ethiopia, a nation of 50 million, was left  with a virtually empty Russian embassy and none of the economic aid  promised by the United States. While Somalia, devastated by a civil war, fought with armaments provided during the Cold War, it was considered so  irrelevant that Washington successfully pushed for reducing the UN  peacekeeping force there. 

The Cold War military assistance fed internal conflicts and the non military aid was largely ineffective. According to then Assistant Secretary  of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, US aid was not based on  sound economic policies. Rather, it was based on government ownership of  major industries, disincentives for agricultural production, and unrealistic  exchange rates. In addition, the poor economic policies were often  accompanied by repressive governance and little pressure put on countries  to reform. It was not until 1990 that the U.S. Department of State announced  that aid to its “old friends in Africa” would be conditioned on progress  toward democracy. 

This policy shift dismayed despots and heartened those Africans  who wanted democracy. US interest in Africa during the Cold War came  late.[9] Until the independence of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and  Mozambique in the 1970s and the subsequent internecine violence, the  Ethiopia-Somalia war in the Horn of Africa, and the expansion of the Soviet  Union into Africa, there was little US attention paid to the continent.  The Carter administration’s attempts to address domestic roots of  conflict in Africa were overwhelmed by the perceived need to contain the  Soviets.[10] Concerns for human rights and democracy took a back seat to  loyalty to the United States in its operations against the Soviet Union. As a  result, the United States supported a number of autocratic regimes, engaged  in “constructive engagement” with South Africa’s apartheid regime during the Reagan administration, and sided with Total Independence of Angola  (UNITA) in the war in Angola. 

The American Cold War imperative of constraining Soviet  expansion contributed to crises that outlived the Cold War itself. US support  for Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the (UNITA) against the  Cuban-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)  led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos exacerbated the situation and complicated  efforts to end the violence that began in 1974 after Angola gained its  independence from Portugal.[11] The United States found itself seeking a  working relationship with dos Santos while still, at the urging of  conservatives in Washington, supporting Savimbi. This despite there being  credible allegations of Savimbi’s human rights violations.[12] US support for  Savimbi finally ended when he refused to accept the election results in 1992,  that the international community considered relatively “free and fair.” 

America’s post-Cold War performance was even less consistent  regarding South Africa.[13] When Frederik de Klerk replaced Peter Botha as  president of the Republic of South Africa, he initiated a rapprochement with  Nelson Mandela and the Africa National Congress (ANC). Under the  Reagan administration, Mandela and the ANC—who received training and  support from the Soviet Union and were allied with the South Africa  Communist Party (SACP)—were designated as international terrorists. 

Some ANC members were released from prison in December 1989,  and in February 1990, Mandela was released, and the ANC was unbanned. The Mandela and the ANC remained on the American terrorist watch list  until 2008, however, nearly two decades after his release from prison.  Despite the terrorist designation, he was still allowed to enter the United  States to visit the UN and the White House. Only after the urging of then  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did the U.S. Congress pass legislation  removing Mandela and the ANC from the list^.[14] 

The current situation in the Horn of Africa is a tragic example of the  vestiges of the US-Soviet proxy wars. International interest in the Horn of  Africa, as previously mentioned, peaked in the late 1970s but gradually decreased in the 1980s.[15] In particular, after Haile Mengistu and Said Barre  signed an agreement ending hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia and  the Soviets withdrew their forces from Afghanistan, the United States lost  much of its Cold War interest in the region. 

The United States established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in  1903, after meetings between Theodore Roosevelt’s emissary, Robert P.  Skinner and Emperor Menelik I, the Ethiopian ruler. Relations were  upgraded to ambassadorial level in 1949.[16] Relations were established with  Liberia in 1864, and Liberian President Edwin Barclay was the first African  to visit the United States in 1943. When Egypt gained its independence from  protectorate status under the United Kingdom in 1922, the United States established diplomatic relations. It was, however, only after World War II  and the start of the Cold War that the United States established direct  relations with other African countries, including Morocco, the first country  in the world to recognize U.S. independence on December 20, 1777. 

In 1989, the George H.W. Bush’s administration’s foreign policy  goal was to cooperate with Moscow in solving regional conflicts, and  Ethiopia was a possible area for joint action.[17] Washington’s general view was that the Soviets were seeking to disengage from the burden of  supporting Ethiopia and were encouraging Mengistu to restore relations  with the United States. Not everyone in Washington agreed with the new  rapprochement, however. There had been no high-level contact with the  Marxist government in Addis Ababa for more than 15 years, and  conservatives in Washington put Mengistu and his colleagues in the same  category as Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Despite the American disenchantment with Mengistu, the US  wanted to settle the issue of Ethiopian Jews who were unable to emigrate to  Israel because of restrictive Ethiopian immigration laws. In addition, Ethiopia’s strategic position in the context of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  argued for continued US engagement with the country.[18]

At that time, it was agreed that the rate of immigration of Ethiopian Jews  would be increased to 1,000 people per month. 

Ethiopian support for the US-led operation against Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait was more complicated. Ethiopia had never been of high strategic  interest to the United States. However, after August 1990, according to  Herman Cohen, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, it  became “More important to us than we had previously thought possible.”[19] In addition to its long Red Sea coastline and the status as the only  predominantly Christian country in a region of Muslim Arab nations, it sat on the UN Security Council, and its vote was critical to achieving the  necessary 9 or 15 votes to support a UN Resolution to authorize the use of  force in Iraq. 

In return for Ethiopia’s support, the United States promised help in  negotiations with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), established  in 1970 to gain Eritrea’s independence. When Eritrea gained its freedom  from Italy after World War II, Ethiopia annexed it and there had been a state  of hostilities since. In addition, the United States sided with Addis Ababa in  its conflict with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). Along with the  Orono Peoples Liberation Front, the TPLF represented the anti-Mengistu  forces of northern Ethiopia. Both the EPLF and the TPLF were socialist, and  the United States did not support them in the Cold War context. 

By 1989, though, Mengistu’s hold on power was weakening.  Ethiopia’s national army had suffered several battlefield losses to EPLF and  TPRF, and disaffection with Mengistu was growing within the senior ranks  of Ethiopia’s army. Attempted coups were undertaken to overthrow  Mengistu; by August 1990, the United States knew that his downfall was  inevitable. 

In May 1991, the TPLF decided to invade and occupy Addis Ababa  and the United States concurred. Mengistu went into exile in Zimbabwe. Many African nations, as well as the Ethiopian diaspora, strongly opposed  US support for the TPLF dominated government that was formed. Yet, this  act of realpolitik was defended as simply recognizing the inevitable facts on  the ground.

What Is the US Position in Africa? 

The foregoing only skims the surface of the historical context of the  American presence in Africa. While the policy decisions over time reflected  U.S. national security concerns—from the US point of view—to many in  Africa our policy often seemed inconsistent when compared to how America dealt with other countries. 

For example, after the civil war in Somalia that led to the overthrow of Siad Barre, a dictator with whom the United States had a close Cold War  relationship, America was accused of having a double standard regarding  crises in Africa. The US and other nations of the West, for example, were  criticized for “their indifferences to the horrors in the Horn of Africa with  their preoccupation with the ‘rich man’s war’ in the former Yugoslavia.”[20] 

Barre’s ouster did not end the violence in Somalia. After insurgent  forces under General Mohammad Farrah Hassan Aidid, a former official in  Barre’s government and Somali ambassador to India, captured Mogadishu,  which forced Barre to flee the country. Aidid’s forces continued to fight  Barre’s army that was attempting to recapture the capital. Rivalries arose  between the various insurgent groups which were clan based. This action  led to persistent conflict between and among the various clan “war lords,” like Aidid. which created a humanitarian and refugee crisis. 

At the time, the United States was focused on the operation to eject  Iraq from Kuwait. Consequently, the US response to Somalia’s crisis was  lukewarm until congressional and media pressure forced the government’s  hand. While military access to ports and bases in Somalia had been  important, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait motivated many of Kuwait’s  neighbors, like Saudi Arabia, to welcome the protective presence of US forces and “military facilities in East Africa suddenly diminished in  importance.”[21] US support for UN humanitarian operations in Somalia were  first limited to providing transport for forces from other countries, but soon  involved deploying US forces as well. 

The Somali “warlords,” especially Aidid, opposed the UN presence  and blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid. Under US pressure, the UN  eventually issued a resolution changing its mission from defensive delivery  of humanitarian aid, with warlords’ permission, to operating in a non permissive environment, and where necessary, disarming insurgent forces.

The American military operation on October 3-4, 1993, to arrest two  of Aidid’s lieutenants, who were rumored to be at a clan gathering in  Mogadishu, involved 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 American ranger and  Special Forces troops.[22] The mission failed after an18-hour urban fight that  left 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead and the downing of two  Black Hawk helicopters. US President Bill Clinton ended the  Administration’s support for the UN mission and ordered US forces out of  the country by March 21, 1994. 

The civil war raged on, and Somalia remained ungoverned for  decades, with pirate gangs along the Indian Ocean coastline preying on vital  commercial shipping lanes for years. Most wealthy and educated Somalis  fled the country. 

The “Battle of Mogadishu” also had a severe impact on US policy  toward Africa and the rest of the world. It ushered in an era of US  isolationism and a wariness to deploy ground forces anywhere. As a result,  there was no US response in 1994 when nearly a million Hutus were  slaughtered in Rwanda or in 1995 when Bosnian Serbs waged a genocidal  campaign against Muslim and Croatian civilians. The isolationism ended on  September 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, but  despite Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama sending thousands  of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, they kept their distance from Islamic  insurgents in Somalia.  

These events show that the US relationship with the nations of  Africa, despite the level of American activity during the Cold War, have  often been characterized by inconsistency and a degree of patronizing  behavior. 

The Biden administration, in addition to publishing a new Africa  policy that committed the United States to being a partner to the African  nations, struck all the right notes on Africa in its national security strategy.[23] The document recognizes Africa’s potential impact on world affairs now  and in the future, and commits to enhanced US-Africa partnerships to  address particular global issues, such as climate change, pandemic  preparedness, violent extremism and terrorism, and global health. 

Cracks in the US-Africa relationship, though, began to appear before  the ink was dry on the new strategy. The Biden administration was criticized  from many quarters for inviting Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of  Equatorial Guinea to attend the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in December  2022.[24] The invitation to Obiang was part of an American diplomatic  campaign to “fend off China’s efforts to build a naval base in Equatorial  Guinea,” but human rights advocates argue that ignoring his 43-year record  of corruption and human rights abuses risks undermining the  administration’s promotion of American values. In addition, democracy  promotion was one of the goals of the summit.[25]

A further blow to US-Africa relations came in February 2023 when  17 African countries, including South Africa abstained in the vote  condemning Russia for invading Ukraine and calling for Moscow’s  immediate withdrawal.[26] South Africa was also one of the 18 African  countries abstaining on the October 22, 2022, UN vote condemning Russia’s  annexations in Ukraine. Eritrea and Mali abstained on the first vote, but  voted with Russia on the second, along with Belarus, North Korea, Syria,  and Nicaragua. 

Relations between the United States and South Africa eroded further  after South African President Ramaphosa announced in Kyiv on June 16,  2023, that he would confer with Russian President Putin on whether Putin  would attend the BRICS Summit to be held in South Africa in August.[27]

Ramaphosa was in Kyiv on an African peace mission with the leaders of  Ukraine and Russia discussing ways to end the hostilities in Ukraine. This  announcement came after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a  warrant for Putin’s arrest for alleged war crimes. As a signatory to the Rome  Statute that formed the ICC, South Africa would be legally obligated to  arrest Putin if he came to South Africa. Some South African officials  suggested that a way out for Ramaphosa would be to ask China to host the Summit, since China, which is not a signatory, would not face the same  obligations. 

In May 2023, the American ambassador to South Africa publicly  alleged that weapons or related technology were loaded onto a Russian ship  that was docked at South Africa’s Simon’s Town Naval base.[28] US officials  in Washington chose to downplay the incident. Ramaphosa announced that  he had appointed a special panel to investigate the allegations. The US Congress called on the Biden administration to act against South Africa on  this issue, including preventing it from hosting a major US-Africa trade  summit to discuss the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act  (AGOA). This legislation gives duty-free access to the US market to certain  African countries. AGOA is due to expire in 2025. The United States must  decide whether to extend it, and which countries to include. John Hudson,  commercial banking agriculture head of Nedbank, expressed concern that  South Africa could be excluded from AGOA if it is found to have aided the  Russians.[29] “It is not just the AGOA trade benefits that are under threat,”  said Hudson. “If there is a complete breakdown of SA-US relations, the  European Union (EU) could follow suit.” If the EU, which has strong trade  links with South Africa, should impose sanctions, the country could lose up  to 40 percent of its trade, which would drive the South African economy  into deep and severe recession, weaken the rand, and cause a collapse of  government finances. 

In sum, while many people in Africa admire American culture and  most business people recognize the importance of access to the huge US market, that does not necessarily translate into the US government’s influence on the continent. Even the economic and trade statistics no longer favor the United States.

China in Africa 

China’s trade with Africa has grown extensively over the past two  decades and now surpasses that of the United States.[30] The value of Chinese  exports to Africa increased from $five billion in 2000 to $110 billion in  2022. Though exports from Africa to China slowed due to the 2021 COVID 19 pandemic, they had reached a total of $62 billion in 2020, with $14 billion  of that in raw materials. 

The value of US exports to Africa, on the other hand, went from  $10.97 billion in 2000 to 30.69 billion in 2022.[31] In 2000, China traded with  only a few African countries, primarily Sudan, Gambia, Benin, and Djibouti.  Yet, by 2022 it was the top supplier of goods to over 30 of Africa’s 54  countries with trade nearly four times that of the United States. 

China is much more than simply a trade partner with Africa. It is  now one of the continent’s largest investors, accounting for 25 percent of  African infrastructure funding in 2018. 

During the Trump administration, Africa was not a top priority for  establishing new trade initiatives. Its approach was reactive, designed to  counter China’s commercial, security, and geopolitical influence in Africa  rather than seeking to fully implement the “Prosper Africa” of 2018 or the  US-Africa Strategy 2019.[32] While US economic engagement with Africa  increased from 2010 to 2019, it was inconsistent and dropped from $31.3  billion in 2019 to $12.7 billion in 2020. 

Though some in Washington believed that competition between the  United States and the Soviet Union in Africa ended with the Soviet collapse  and the Cold War’s end, the period of US Russia détente was short-lived. The 1990s saw a significant Russian disengagement from Africa.[33] Russia’s post-breakup leaders, from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Zhirinovsky blamed Russia’s economic problems on the cost of Soviet aid to developing  countries in Africa and elsewhere. Since Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as  Russia’s president in 1999, however, there has been a slow but steady  increase in Russia’s presence in Africa. It includes dispatching Russian  troops to support UN peacekeeping operations in eight countries. In 2014,  Russia had more military personnel deployed in support of UN operations  in Africa than France, the UK, and the United States combined. 

Russia also has increased its trade ties with Africa. Though modest  as a percentage of Russia’s total trade volume, trade with Africa increased  more than tenfold between 2000 and 2012. 

In 2019, Russia’s stepped-up activities in Africa began to raise concern in the United States of renewed great-power competition with more  than just China.[34] In the period immediately after the Soviet Union’s  breakup, Russia was considered a “superpower in retreat,” with its ambitions  and influence largely confined to its immediate periphery. Since Putin’s rise  to power, however, Russia has become a serious actor in areas far beyond  its borders enabling it to make its presence felt in ways not seen since the  heyday of the Cold War.  

Lacking the economic clout and military capability of either the  United States or China, Russia has nonetheless established its global power  credentials “on the cheap,” by outsourcing many risky or costly ventures to  nonstate actors and using resources effectively to capitalize on opportunities  as they arise. 

This initiative is seen clearly in Russia’s efforts to return to Africa  after three decades of abandonment when its global ambitions brought down  the weak Soviet economy. No longer could the struggling post-Soviet  Russia support the former national liberation movements—now governing  parties—in Angola, Mozambique, and the like. With the collapse of the  Soviet Union, these relationships came to an abrupt halt. For the following  twenty years, Russian activity in Africa was negligible except for operations  by Russian arms dealers and oligarchs. 

As Russia’s economy stabilized, it began reestablishing a foothold  in Africa. At first it focused on South Africa and the African Union (AU),  and then on participating in African peacekeeping operations and in the  international anti-piracy task force off Somalia’s coast. Eventually, efforts  were made to establish renewed security ties. 

Russia also enjoys a reputational advantage with many of the current  ruling parties beholden for Soviet support during their independence  struggles. In addition, many politicians and military figures were trained in  the former Soviet Union. Also, Russian officials portray US democracy  promotion in Africa as “neocolonialism,” rhetoric which appeals to  autocratic regimes where representative government is absent, fragile, or under assault. 

Russia’s security presence in Africa currently consists primarily of  private military contractors (PMC), most notably the Wagner Group,[35] which was founded in 2014 by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian  oligarch with close ties to Vladimir Putin. The Wagner Group, even after  the death of Prigozhin and its top leadership in a plane crash in Russia in  2023, continues to operate in Africa, especially in the Sahel, and is used to  advance the Kremlin’s foreign policy interests through providing direct  military support and training and related security services to the military  juntas in that region in return for access to minerals. According to some  estimates, the Wagner Group has around five thousand members in at least  half a dozen African countries It has been implicated in human rights  violations in support of the military junta in Mali and has reportedly offered  arms to the paramilitary Rapid Support forces (RSF) in Sudan, despite  previously having supported General Abdel Fattah al-Burban, head of  Sudan’s national army against whom the RSF is fighting.[36]

After the July 2023 military coup in Mali, while the Wagner Group  leader praised the coup and offered the organization’s services to bring order  to the region [37] the Kremlin issued a statement calling for a speedy return to of the rule of law in the country.[38]

These events came following a poorly attended Russia-Africa  summit in St. Petersburg, Russia on July 28, when only 17 African heads of  state showed up.[39] This is less than half the 43 who attended in the first such  meeting in 2019. The leaders of some of Africa’s largest economies,  including Nigeria, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda,  were among the no-shows.  

Putin continues to try to drive wedges between African countries and  the West, most notably the United States and Europe. And many Africans  decry what they see as condescension toward Africa as well as the legacy of  the colonial past. Russia’s decision in July 2023 to pull out of an agreement  with Ukraine to enable the export of grain, which many countries in Africa  rely on, enraged countries like Kenya. Putin’s weaponization of food  supplies has strained Russia’s relations with some African countries where  food insecurity is a matter of life and death. 

Russia’s disdainful and disrespectful treatment of the June 2023  African peace mission to Ukraine and Russia, including bombing Kyiv  while the mission was there, has also left leaders angry. 

Any African decline in supporting Russia will not necessarily  translate into increased support for the United States or Europe—especially  in former French colonies. In the past three years, six countries in western  and central Africa have suffered military coups, five of them former French  colonies.[40] While there is no confirmation that Russia might have instigated  Niger’s rebellion, Moscow hasn’t hesitated to take advantage of anti 

Western sentiment. Niger, the largest country in West Africa, is a leading  supplier of uranium, producing nearly five percent of the world’s supply,  and is rich in other natural resources. Despite its mineral wealth, it is one of  the poorest countries in the world, and many Nigeriens, especially the  younger generations, blame France for their poverty. This sentiment is  common in many other former French colonies such as Mali and Burkina  Faso. 

While the decline in democratically elected governments is troubling  in itself, with the entire Sahel region under undemocratic military rule, there  could be increased instability, more populations dislocation and an opening  to greater Russian influence. The stakes are particularly high for the United  States in Niger where it has over 1,000 military troops, including those  stationed at a drone base in Agadez. This small town in Niger’s desert region  is the place where reconnaissance and attack missions against terrorist  organizations are launched. The military takeover in July 2023 has  jeopardized the future of the base and other US military training programs  for the Nigerien military. 

Where To Go from Here? 

From the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope, the situation in  Africa is at times like “looking through a glass darkly.” While several sub Saharan countries voted with the Western bloc on the UN resolutions  condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine many abstained. And  influential South Africa, acted in other ways that portrayed it as leaning  toward Russia despite its claims of neutrality. South Africa’s ruling ANC  party, though not representing the views of the majority of South Africans,  in particular, not the South African business community has been fairly  direct in its support for Russia. This issue has raised concerns in Washington  by holding joint naval exercises with Russia and China around the time of  the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Open conflict in Ethiopia and Sudan, and a string of military  takeovers in the Sahel and Central Africa, especially the military coup  ousting the first democratically elected president in Niger in July 2023, have  also exposed the West’s limited influence over events on the continent. 

While the decline in American influence in Francophone Africa is  related to the declining French influence, the inconsistency of US Africa  policy plays a significant role. In the 1990s, Washington struggled to  redefine America’s international role in the “unipolar moment,” especially  in the Cold War battlefields in Africa.[41] The African continent, for the most  part, was an area of no strong strategic interest to the United States other  than the fear of Soviet expansion. Thus, in the post-Cold War period, Africa  was essentially downgraded. As one speaker noted at an African Futures  conference sponsored by the University of Southern California in  Washington, DC, on July 31, 2023, “Most Africans feel that the western-led  international order has not served them well.” China and Russia appear to have put aside some of their historical  differences to work together to create a new “just, democratic world  order,”[42] according to a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei  Lavrov on March 30, 2022. The objective of this “new world order” is to establish an international system that accommodates their interests and is no  longer dominated by the West. Lavrov’s statement was supported by Yang  Jiechi [43] director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the  CCP’s Central Committee. In a September 13, 2022, statement after a  meeting with the outgoing Russian ambassador, he said. “The Chinese side  is willing to work with the Russian side to continuously implement high level strategic cooperation between the two countries, safeguard common  interests and promote the development of the international order in a more  just and reasonable direction.”  

In a February 10, 2023, Voice of America article, the 2023 Munich  Security Conference report stated that African countries’ discontent with the  West has not translated into a desire for Beijing or Moscow to wield greater  influence over the international order.[44] While Africans are dissatisfied with  the global system led by Western countries, they are also opposed to Russia  and China gaining greater influence in the international system. What  African countries would prefer, according to David Monyae at the  University of Johannesburg, is a world order that is fair to all continents and  countries. Africa wants its voice to be heard and to be given a role to play  in shaping international laws and rules. There are several ways that the  United States could use the African desire to be more equal participants in  the international order to advance American interests. A starting point is  honest acceptance of African agency and interacting with African nations as  a partner rather than a patron. 

Giving Africans a Voice in the Global Order 

The Biden administration made a good start in its Africa policy  regarding giving Africans a stronger say in shaping the international order  when it announced that it would support adding the AU to the UN Security Council. It also called for AU’s permanent membership in the G20.[45] “Africa belongs at the table in every room—in every room where global  challenges are being discussed and in every institution where discussions  are taking place,” Biden said in addressing the US-Africa Leaders Summit  in Washington, DC in December 2022. A way to put some substance behind  these words would be to push hard to make AU a member of the security  council without delay, and to make it one of the “permanent” members,  ensuring that Africa has a voice and a vote in all that the UN does far into  the future. The positions taken by other members of the security council  regarding AU permanent membership, especially China and Russia, would  send an unambiguous signal of where they stand. 

Counterterrorism and Security versus Africa’s Long-Term Development

While counterterrorism (CT) and national security are issues that the  US and African countries—regardless of their form of government—can  collectively agree upon, U.S. CT operations and military assistance have not  always had the intended effect.[46]Those operations that indiscriminately  support authoritarian governments undermine the credibility of US policy  and risks fueling support for extremist movements. While those who support  providing US military assistance to authoritarian states who are at the  forefront of CT efforts believe that this has a “socializing effect,” and can  inculcate the values of democracy, respect for human rights, and  professionalism, the actual outcomes, like the case of the Malian military  which overthrew civilian governments in 2012 and 2020, have been mixed.  Many of Africa’s authoritarian regimes have used US military training and  support as an opportunity to overpower their domestic political opponents. 

While the United States has withheld or withdrawn support for some  authoritarian regimes, such as Eritrea and Zimbabwe, this has not always  been the case. In order to establish legitimacy, Washington should apply its  policy consistently and impartiality, with no exceptions made for dictators  or military forces that engage in unconstitutional seizure of power. 

Empowering African Women

The percentage of women in Africa varies depending on the country. On average, women make up about 50 percent of the continent’s total  population.[47] Yet, women constitute only 24 percent of the 12, 113  parliamentarians in Africa, 25 percent in the lower houses and 20 percent in  the upper houses, according to the first Women’s Political participation, Africa Barometer 2021.[48] US policy and programs in Africa should focus more on involving women in the political decision making and peace and  security processes. 

Enhance Democracy Promotion

Since the Carter administration, human rights and democracy have  been constant elements of US foreign policy. Sometimes these values have  been strongly emphasized and at other times given less emphasis by  succeeding administrations, reaching its nadir during the Trump  administration.[49] At that time, human rights and democratization were  systematically deprioritized, giving nations like China and Russia the  opening to be more assertive in challenging democratic norms in places like  Africa. Washington’s credibility on these issues has been further eroded due  to the domestic political turmoil in the United States since the 2020 elections. 

Re-establishing American influence in Africa will require  Washington to enhance promotion of democracy through African agency,[50] and not on the issue of “Chinese influence” on the continent, in addition to  shoring up democracy in the United States. If American influence in Africa  is to be enhanced it must be based on the needs of Africa and its people and  not framed as a venue for US-China competition. 

The United States has lost ground in Africa to countries like China  and Russia. Increasing US influence need not be a zero-sum game. Africans  want the freedom to choose their relationships, and in the case of the US and  China, would like to have productive relationships with both. While  Washington should continue to pursue US national security  objectives, the aforementioned recommendations offer non-confrontational ways to build American influence in Africa in  a sustainable manner, moving the US position in Africa to  more solid ground.