16 minutes
The Trump administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept calls for European allies to assume primary responsibility for their own conventional defense while the United States redirects resources to other priorities and pursues diplomacy with Russia. Unfortunately, the administration’s pursuit of other goals is undercutting this vision. Washington has sought territorial concessions from allies, imposed tariffs, weighed in on allies’ domestic politics, and engaged in operations against Iran that depend on a robust US military presence in Europe. Collectively, these policies have eroded the perception of shared interests needed for continued partnership, added friction to European rearmament, and delayed US posture changes. To promote NATO 3.0, Washington should abandon these competing objectives, continue to reduce the US military’s role in the region, and adjust force structure to redirect resources to higher priorities.
Introduction
In February 2026, the Trump administration unveiled “NATO 3.0,” an ambitious concept for restructuring the trans-Atlantic alliance.[1] Under the new vision, Europe would take the lead in its own conventional defense while the United States redirects military resources to the Western Hemisphere and Pacific. Washington would also try to stabilize NATO-Russian relations, beginning with brokering an end to the war in Ukraine. As a tangible step toward this vision, the United States recently announced it would reduce the forces it makes available to NATO in a crisis.[2]
But other aspects of US policy are not yet aligned with this vision. Reductions in the US peacetime presence in Europe have been modest to date. Further, the administration has not articulated how posture changes will translate into more resources for higher priorities. Meanwhile, pursuit of other goals is undercutting NATO 3.0. The United States is pressuring allies to cede territory, weighing in on allies’ domestic politics, imposing tariffs on the European Union and the United Kingdom, and conducting military operations in the Middle East that depend on a robust US military presence in Europe. Collectively, these policies have eroded the allied trust needed for continued partnership, added friction to European rearmament, and delayed necessary posture and force structure changes.
NATO 3.0 correctly aims to align resources with the limited US interests that are under threat in Europe. To realize this vision, the administration should set aside competing goals, take further steps to reduce the US military role in Europe, and adjust the size and composition of the US military to redirect resources for higher priorities.
NATO 3.0’s Goals Are Right
The argument for NATO 3.0, made by Undersecretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby, starts from a strong premise that previous administrations have also acknowledged: The United States can no longer afford to do everything, everywhere.[3] China’s sustained economic and military rise is eroding US military advantages in the Pacific. Conflicts in the Middle East and Europe are consuming US attention and resources. Meanwhile, the national debt has reached $38 trillion[4] — roughly 120 percent of US gross domestic product. Washington needs to set priorities amid these mounting fiscal and strategic challenges.
The threat environment in Europe makes limited US retrenchment feasible. The United States has a vital interest in preventing a hostile power from dominating the continent, but there is no near-term risk of that occurring. The war in Ukraine has shown that Russia is unable to control a single country on its border, let alone all of Europe. European allies have the economic resources to prevent Russian domination over the long term. Allies have an eleven-to-one[5] economic advantage over Russia and a four-to-one advantage in population.[6] European defense spending is roughly three times that of Russia’s.[7] As the 2026 National Defense Strategy states bluntly, Russia is “in no position to make a bid for European hegemony.”[8]
The United States has secondary interests in the region too. Washington has good reasons to prevent and end large-scale conflicts on the continent (like the war in Ukraine), which can draw the United States in, increase the risk of nuclear use, damage the US economy, and cause human suffering.[9] Trade and investment with Europe support US economic growth. Security alignment with allies facilitates intelligence sharing, military access, and technology cooperation that help Washington protect its global interests.
Russia does pose a threat to some of these interests. Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine has destabilized the region and hurt global trade. Russia has the capability to launch a large-scale conventional attack on a NATO member. However, the risk of such an attack is low. Notably, Russia has been deterred from conventional attacks to stop NATO allies from arming Ukraine even as questions about US commitments to Europe have been growing.[10] Allies can continue to deter Moscow as the United States retrenches too. Allies already have many of the capabilities to defend against a Russian attack in Eastern Europe, where allies are most worried Moscow would strike.[11] An operational and budgetary analysis found that allies would need to spend around 3 percent GDP on defense to quickly replace most US contributions for an Eastern Europe contingency.[12] Since then, allies have committed to 3.5 percent of GDP for core defense spending, putting them on the right trajectory.[13] Allies have also been talking about deepening regional military cooperation to offset individual allies’ limitations and avoid redundancies as they rearm.[14]
Given this assessment of US interests, the scale of the threats to them, and allies’ capabilities, the United States should reduce the costs of its security involvement in Europe.
In 2021, Political scientist Barry Posen identified $80 billion per year in potential savings if Europe took more responsibility for ground forces and tactical air capabilities.[15] Forgoing savings on this scale might be justified if vital US interests were under threat and European allies lacked the capacity to do more. That was the case in the early Cold War, but not today. NATO 3.0 balances the competing demands of the present environment: freeing up resources for higher priorities elsewhere by reducing the US role while still protecting secondary US interests like stability and economic ties by promoting European strength and trying to stabilize relations with Moscow.
To be sure, NATO 3.0 comes with tradeoffs. First, the United States may lose influence as allies become more independent. In the past, military dependence sometimes led allies to support US priorities beyond Europe, such as through military deployments to support US interventions in distant theaters. As allies gain confidence in their own military capabilities, they will be less fearful about losing US support if they do not accede to this type of request from Washington. This is an acceptable tradeoff. The United States should encourage allies to focus on European defense and reduce its own military involvement in the Middle East, as the 2025 National Security Strategy envisioned anyway.[16] Moreover, retrenchment from Europe will not end US influence or transatlantic cooperation. US economic power still gives it leverage on many issues, while shared interests in other domains can sustain cooperation with self-sufficient partners.
Second, there is some risk that European allies will not step up militarily despite having the capacity to do so. If deterrence failed as a result, any resulting war would hurt secondary US interests. The risk of this outcome is low, however. Allies’ capabilities are already substantial, as noted previously. And Europe’s motivation to strengthen its collective capabilities is higher than it has been in decades, driven by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, Moscow’s gray-zone activities against NATO members, and growing perceptions of US unreliability.
Given the need to rebalance US resources and these acceptable tradeoffs, NATO 3.0 makes strategic sense.
Working Against Itself
Unfortunately, the Trump administration has not focused narrowly on realizing this sound vision. Instead, the administration has been pursuing other objectives that undermine NATO 3.0 in several ways: exploiting allies’ dependence, eroding the foundations of transatlantic cooperation, creating impediments to European rearmament, delaying US posture changes, and complicating talks with Russia.
First, some recent US policies have exploited European dependence rather than trying to end it. In early 2026, the administration threatened Denmark and other allies with tariffs and initially refused to rule out military force to secure Greenland. Recent US threats to withdraw from NATO if allies do not contribute more to the war in Iran[17] also signaled that the administration prefers dependent, pliable allies rather than the equal partnership NATO 3.0 envisions.
Second, the Trump administration’s focus on European domestic politics is undermining the sense of shared interests that should anchor continued partnership under NATO 3.0. At the 2025 Munich Security Conference, Vice President JD Vance argued that the greatest threat to Europe was “not Russia” but the “threat from within,” citing “out-of-control migration” and alleged political censorship.[18] The State Department is reportedly developing plans to fund right-wing European think tanks[19] to defend what the 2025 National Security Strategy called a “core” interest in restoring “Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.”[20] German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz described this policy as “unacceptable” and called for Europe to “become much more independent of the United States in security policy.”[21] The perception of diverging interests in other areas has led to tangible reductions in security cooperation. For example, concerns about US operations in the Caribbean and policy toward Russia, reportedly led the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to modestly limit intelligence[22] sharing with the United States.
Third, US economic policies are complicating allies’ efforts to strengthen their military capabilities. While the administration convinced allies to adopt a target of 3.5 percent of GDP for core defense spending at the 2025 Hague Summit, economic and military policies—such as tariffs on the European Union and the conflict with Iran, which has driven up energy costs—are adding economic headwinds that make those targets harder to reach.
Leveraging allies’ security dependence to secure commercial deals that privilege US firms, another U.S. priority, could also undermine local support for defense spending and regional cooperation. For example, an executive order in February 2026 called for using arms sales to support American reindustrialization and maintain market dominance.[23] Colby acknowledged that NATO allies need to buy domestically to sustain political support for higher defense spending,[24] but Washington might still be tempted to condition US presence and commitments on arms purchases. Doing so could push some allies to buy American rather than spending at home and coordinating acquisitions with regional partners, as a European-led deterrent requires.
A fourth set of policies is delaying US posture changes. The Trump administration’s request for a $1.5 trillion defense budget—including a 44 percent increase for the Department of War[25]—also reduces pressure to make hard choices. Without budgetary constraints, Congress is unlikely to agree to reduce resources devoted to Europe. Moreover, US forces in Europe have been involved in operations against Iran.[26] Until Washington scales back its ambitions in the Middle East, the United States will have an incentive to keep a robust presence in Europe to support its own operations and retain leverage to secure allied contributions.
Fifth, the Iran war undercut NATO 3.0 in several other ways too. The conflict put the United States and Russia on opposing sides of yet another conflict, complicating talks with Moscow.[27] Russia announced a pause in talks with Ukraine and the United States after the war began.[28] And Russia benefited from rising energy costs[29] and a temporary easing of sanctions,[30] reducing pressure on Moscow to end the war in Ukraine.
Threatening to withdraw US forces to punish allies that did not support the war also undercuts regional cooperation. The administration has reportedly considered shifting US forces from European countries like Germany that did not support the Iran war to those that did.[31] Such a move would pit allies against each other when they need to work more closely together to build collective strength. Moreover, asking allies to contribute to operations in other regions distracts these states from focusing on Europe where their attention is needed.
Overall, the administration has succeeded in sparking higher allied defense spending but does not seem to have fully bought into its own vision for NATO 3.0. US economic policies are creating headwinds for European rearmament. Threats against Greenland and involvement in allies’ internal politics are incentivizing a very different version of European defense autonomy from the enduring partnership that NATO 3.0 envisions. And Washington has not accepted NATO 3.0’s fundamental tradeoff: less leverage over allies in exchange for European regional security leadership.
The best way to resolve these tensions would be to prioritize NATO 3.0 over competing objectives. The upcoming NATO Summit in July would be a good opportunity to reset. For example, the president could emphasize allies’ development of capabilities for European contingencies, not demands for contributions to operations in the Middle East. He could also reassure allies that long-term plans will guide posture changes (to the extent international conditions allow) and that deployments will not suddenly change to reward or punish individual allies over policy differences.
Making it Work
Even without greater strategic discipline, Washington should proceed with implementing NATO 3.0. The recent announcement that the United States will reduce the forces available for NATO crisis operations is a step in the right direction.[32] The next steps should include developing and initiating long-term plans for significant reductions in US peacetime presence, picking up the pace of withdrawals, building broader US domestic support, making plans to adjust force structure, coordinating with allies about US plans, assessing implications for extended nuclear deterrence, and continuing talks with Russia.
Washington should develop and initiate long-term plans for significant reductions in US peacetime presence in Europe now. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced a review of US posture in Europe at the recent NATO defense ministerial.[33] Any resulting plans should seize the window of opportunity that is currently open: Europe is more motivated to spend on defense than it has been in decades, and Russia is weakened and distracted by its war against Ukraine. Some critics oppose significant changes while the war in Ukraine continues.[34] But, the timing for a transition will always be imperfect since a ceasefire will not end tensions or the risk of future conflict. Meanwhile, European political momentum for defense spending may falter if fears of Russia recede and domestic resistance to higher spending grows—especially if allies later conclude Washington will once again pick up the slack. Waiting for the perfect time is how “not now” becomes “not ever.”
The pace of reductions needs to pick up too, though cognizance about associated tradeoffs is warranted. Moving too fast risks stoking European fears of capability gaps and prompting panicked, inefficient investments. Going too slowly delays US resource shifts and risks a return to chronic European underinvestment. So far, the administration has moved too slowly rather than too quickly. The United States withdrew 800 personnel in Romania in 2025, roughly 1 percent of the 80,000 US military personnel in the region.[35] After a series of announcements in May 2026 about potential US posture changes in Germany and Poland, it appears the United States only plans to reduce its presence in the region by about 5,000 US personnel over the next year or so.[36]
To meet the NATO 3.0 vision, the United States needs a plan to change force structure—the size and composition of the military—not just where those forces are located. However, the Pentagon has not yet explained how retrenchment from Europe will enable force structure changes to either reduce defense spending or shift resources toward other priorities like deterring China in the Pacific. One benchmark for NATO 3.0’s success is whether these changes put the United States on a path to free up billions—rather than millions—of dollars for these priorities.
To make significant posture and force structure changes, the administration will need to build more congressional support. Current law mandates aspects of US force structure and requires advance notice and allied consultation before making major posture changes in Europe.[37] This law gives Congress time to oppose changes it considers precipitous. The administration therefore needs a plan to build support for NATO 3.0 within Congress. And because the transition to European defense leadership will not be complete by the next presidential election, the administration needs to build a wider base of support for this multi-year project.[38]
Coordinating transparently with allies will help build that support. Allies can make smarter investments with clear information about US plans, and the act of consultation indicates a US commitment to an orderly and responsible transition. That signal matters not only to allies but also to Congress, where it can ease concerns about reckless withdrawal and reduce domestic opposition to the new strategy. This means the United States should avoid surprise, last-minute announcements like those surrounding deployments in Poland in May. Instead, the administration should use opportunities like the upcoming NATO summit to commit to sharing long-term plans and giving allies opportunities for input (without giving them a veto).
The administration should also answer unresolved questions about NATO 3.0. For example, there needs to be a plan for what US forces will remain in Europe after retrenchment is complete. NATO 3.0 envisions extending the US nuclear umbrella over NATO while providing “more limited and focused”[39] conventional contributions, but questions remain about how conventional retrenchment will affect the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and allies’ roles in that mission.
Finally, the administration should prioritize NATO 3.0’s diplomatic prong. A harmonious relationship with Moscow is unrealistic, but there are opportunities to reduce tensions and manage conflicts of interest. Pursuing an end to the war in Ukraine has been the right instinct, but the administration should not settle for just any deal. Conflict is more likely to recur with a weak agreement. A deal that caters primarily to Moscow’s preferences could also convince European allies that US and European interests have fundamentally diverged, undermining cooperation. A durable settlement needs to reflect battlefield realities and include mechanisms that support a lasting peace such as third-party monitoring, dispute resolution procedures, and a demilitarized zone.
Beyond Ukraine, the United States should pursue broader risk-reduction measures with Russia. Improving communication with Moscow through steps such as the recent restoration of military-to-military dialogue can reduce dangers of miscalculation now and in what will remain a tense post-war period.[40]
Following Through
Past administrations tried but failed to rebalance the US military away from Europe and toward other priorities like the Pacific. The Trump administration has a chance to succeed where they did not. Conditions for the transition to European-led regional defense are unusually favorable now: allies are spending more, cooperating more deeply, and united in viewing Russia as a serious threat, while Moscow itself is bogged down in Ukraine.
The administration has a sound vision for how to seize this opportunity to update the alliance. But making NATO 3.0 more than a slogan will require taking practical steps to retrench from Europe and rebalance US force structure as well as subordinating competing objectives—territorial gains, trade leverage, changing Europe’s domestic politics, and reshaping the Middle East—to rebooting the alliance on terms that best support long-term US interests.
