Lawrence Rubin in conversation with General Philip M. Breedlove and Admiral James A. Winnefeld
This interview was originally published in Vol.64, Issue 4, in August 2020.
This summer, I had the privilege of extended conversations with General Philip M. Breedlove and Admiral James A. Winnefeld, both of whom retired around the same time after highly decorated careers in the United States military. In the interviews, these practitioners, draw from their illustrious careers, serving across different military institutions, as well as from their engineering backgrounds. They offer unique practitioners’ perspectives on the national security implications of emerging technologies.
Gen. Breedlove and Adm. Winnefeld touch on several important threats, opportunities, and challenges related to emerging technologies and the future of warfare. These interviews try to capture how these leaders view emerging and disruptive technology, and the way it affects, and is affected by, the operational and strategic environment. One of my main take-aways, from the perspective of an analyst, is the importance of remembering that it’s one thing to develop a technology, but it’s another thing to know how, from the start, you will field it and how it might affect the strategic environment. In addition, they recommend that technologists and strategists be in constant dialogue.
These conversations will not only affect government planning, but also design choices by manufacturers of these emerging technologies that the government seeks to acquire.
Lawrence Rubin: Throughout your career— and especially in your last position where you concurrently served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, European Combatant Command—how have you viewed the relationship between emerging technologies, operations, and strategy?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: On the U.S. side, emerging technological capabilities are important, but aren’t important until our system fields them. But to field them, we need to have sufficient quantities of these capabilities to have an effect on the battlefield. On the other hand, there is a value to having a “technology reveal.”’ Russian President Vladimir Putin did this publicly. The Russians produced a long discernable weapon— a long-range underwater torpedo. There was a public outcry that it was a mistake. But, as we’ve learned publicly, it was not a mistake. We are pretty sure this was a technology reveal. Back to my original point, these capabilities are good, but not good until they are fielded in quantities to have an effect.
Dr. Rubin: How do you define a disruptive or emerging technology? What were/are some of the of the most disruptive technologies or capabilities which kept/keep you up at night?
Gen. Breedlove: A disruptive technology brings new technologies or capabilities that we have not planned for. It also encompasses those technologies that deny our advantages in certain areas, such as space-based operations (and for targeting), stealth technologies, etc.
Everyone is worried about hypersonic weapons. Russia is worried about our missile defense. But we all know we don’t have enough missile defense to defend against a major attack and that our missile defense is geared toward defending against attacks from countries like Iran.
Look at how hard Russia and China work to take away our advantage. They see space as our area of dominance, and they have worked very hard in Electronic Warfare to deny us advantage. They have also seen what stealth can do. They see what the Israelis have done (with U.S. equipment), and they are working on stealth. Those are very disruptive capabilities in that they are working hard to deny us advantage.
Sometimes, it’s not the new technologies—it’s old technology combinations. This whole area of hybrid warfare, almost none of it is new. But what’s new is the audacity of how it’s used.
What worries me most? Biological threats. Look at what COVID did. This worries me more than nukes. Biotechnological threat is a risk, but if we don’t learn anything from this COVID crisis, then shame on us.
Dr. Rubin: What are some of the constraints or pressures surrounding the deployment of emerging/disruptive technologies?
Gen. Breedlove: In a budget-constrained environment, government and the Department of Defense are making it hard to conduct leading-edge research. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and others were advancing these efforts, but now what we see are companies not investing in research because they are legally bound with what they can and can’t do with the company’s money. They have to fund efforts through Independent Research and Development projects. In the past, governments and think tanks combined to come up with programs.
I was at a University Affiliated Research Center, and when I claimed we were behind China on artificial intelligence and Quantum computing, I was corrected. The problem, the applied researchers said, was that we are more advanced, but China has the massive (government) money to field technology and is doing it. The United States isn’t fielding the technologies. This is the case in hypersonic weapons also. We are investing a fraction of what China’s government is investing.
Dr. Rubin: Practically speaking, how do you signal these technological capabilities without using them to achieve a strategic effect?
Gen. Breedlove: Through a “technology reveal”; relatively public testing. The United States does this well; Russia does this well in a different way. Russia puts its new capability out before it’s quite ready and then it explodes. When the United States puts it out, people know it works. Our culture of an aversion to failure drives this, but there is a tendency to overengineer. A failure becomes an acquisition decision rather than an acquisition of technology.
Dr. Rubin: Have we entered a period where technological developments have made power projection more difficult?
Gen. Breedlove: Let me reframe the question. While we don’t want to fight Russia or China, does technology change the deterrence balance? It’s tough because if we test a powerful laser that can be used to shoot down ballistic missiles, is it stabilizing or destabilizing? Do we really want to create a new offensive capability? We would not want to create huge instabilities. But if we made some big breakthrough, we would have to be careful how we field it.
Lawrence Rubin: How well are strategic concepts linked to technology today? In what ways do they diverge? What are some examples?
Adm. James Winnefeld: We are in a bit of a two-part tail chase: our technology is currently chasing strategic concepts that are in turn becoming increasingly difficult to execute. Let me use the Pacific as an example. In the first part of that tail chase, if our current strategic concept is to treat the Chinese military as the center of gravity, and to use offensive power projection against that military, some of our technologies are helping remain competitive in that fight, and others are lagging. Let me use a very simple example. The F-35 is a very tough, though somewhat short-legged, system for the Chinese to defeat. But the Chinese are developing capabilities, such as hypersonic and anti-ship weapons, that are pushing outward our ability to safely base those F-35s, whether on land or at sea, within a viable range of their targets. In this regard, our technology is lagging. Were we more fulsomely to embrace defensive technologies, such as directed energy, we might be able to flip the advantage back to the defense, and bring those F-35s back closer to the Chinese mainland.
Dr. Rubin: What are some of the most important emerging/disruptive technologies today?
Adm. Winnefeld: Some of the more potentially disruptive technologies are high powered microwaves (HPM), extremely smart and capable undersea systems (including very smart offensive mines), hypersonic weapons, and fully integrated and secure command and control systems.
Dr. Rubin: How would you define an emerging or disruptive technology?
Adm. Winnefeld: Any technology that completely negates an opponent’s existing system or otherwise requires an opponent to have to rethink all of his assumptions regarding warfare is something that would qualify as disruptive. I will use HPM as an example. Unlike lasers, they are not affected by weather, and can wreak havoc on any weapon that requires electronics to find its target. Unlike kinetic interceptors, magazine size and exchange rate costs are not a factor. Especially when combined with a range of kinetic interceptors, they have the potential to dramatically increase the survivability of land and sea bases, and could at least theoretically render entire currently in-service classes of weapons—namely cruise missiles and guided ballistic missiles—largely obsolete.
Dr. Rubin: How well are these new technologies integrated into U.S. strategy?
Adm. Winnefeld: There is a mixed record on this. Some new technologies, such as hypersonics, are on a solid development path. We were late to the game, and sometimes it feels like we are playing catch-up because our high-end adversaries are developing them, and we haven’t really thought through why they felt the need to do so. It turns out that Russia and China are both deeply intimidated by U.S. missile defense capability, to include unknowns in their minds, which could in their view upset strategic stability. That’s why you see different exotic systems being developed, such as the long-range undersea nuclear weapon revealed in a PowerPoint slide over Vladimir Putin’s shoulder in a photograph. We found ourselves behind and felt the urge to catch up, and we will eventually have better hypersonic weapons than either Russia or China—that’s just who we are. And, even though it feels like we’re responding just to keep up, it turns out that hypersonics can be useful to us within our current operational concept, and may eventually also be useful in left-of-launch defeat of a North Korean missile threat. Other disruptive technologies, such as HPM and offensive mines, are lagging far behind.
Dr. Rubin: Does strategy come before technological development or has the reverse happened?
Adm. Winnefeld: Strategy to me is about maintaining an equilibrium among four variables: ends, ways, means, and the prevailing security environment. If one variable changes, the others must be adjusted, or you fall out of balance and risk increases. So, in answer to the question, if the security environment deteriorates, and one’s ends remain constant, then ways and means are the only paths available to restore equilibrium. “Ways” include the strategic and operational concepts we use to accomplish our ends, and “means” are the things we buy to breathe life into those concepts. As such, there should be a virtuous cycle between ways and means. If an existing way begins to falter and a new way is envisioned, it could send a demand signal to the technologist for something that enables the new concept. By the same token, if the technologist independently comes up with something new and different, especially something disruptive, it could cause the strategist to either advance or completely change an existing strategy. This is why it is so terribly important for technologists and strategists to have continuing dialogue, to do everything possible to understand what the other side is thinking and doing.
Dr. Rubin: Is the United States using technology to keep a declining concept afloat rather than exploring a relationship between new concepts and new technologies or existing technologies used in new ways or new combinations?
Adm. Winnefeld: This goes to the second half of the tail chase. Even if we are successful in developing disruptive weapons, at some point, the Chinese will be able to counter them, either through sheer numbers or by improving their own technology. At some point, we will need to move to the third horizon of innovation (rethinking our entire strategic concept), which in turn requires going back to first principles. What do the Chinese fear the most? Given their advances in technology and increased capacity, combined with the advantages in initiative and distance I mentioned above, they are less and less worried about the U.S. military. But as an authoritarian power, especially one that has an emerging middle-class consumption economy, their number one fear is loss of control of their population. This is something Western societies don’t even think about, but it’s at the forefront of Chinese leadership’s thinking every single day.
How do we approach that vulnerability? It requires a whole new way of thinking, across all elements of national power, and is mostly about economics and information. As to the military’s contribution, which may be in support rather than in the lead, should such a concept be necessary and viable, different technologies from the ones we are currently developing at the second horizon (which is merely step improvements within the current concept) could become more important. These technologies could include the smart mines but also non-lethal technologies, such as ways of stopping ships without physically damaging them, or tying up container ports, or bringing the truth to closed information networks.
Dr. Rubin: How and in what ways are hypersonic weapons the second horizon of innovation?
Adm. Winnefeld: The first horizon of innovation is essentially incremental improvements to technologies that exist within our current concept. Industry is really good at this. As I mentioned above, the second horizon of innovation is step
improvements in technology, but still supporting the current concept. Hypersonics are being developed with this in mind, a major improvement to our capabilities within the concept of holding the Chinese military at risk. This could hold for a while, even though we must consider that attacking the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary is fraught with risk, which is one reason why Russia and China have wisely begun fighting within the so-called “gray zone” of warfare. This new “way” being used by our adversaries includes non-attributable use of information warfare and the use of proxies in both cyber and physical space, among other methods short of open state-on-sate warfare.
Dr. Rubin: Where does the development of countermeasures fall?
Adm. Winnefeld: It goes without saying that as soon as one side comes up with a potentially disruptive weapon, the other side will attempt to defeat it. Hypersonic weapons are a tough problem for several reasons. Their high speed and ability to maneuver at that speed means a kinetic interceptor needs to have even more maneuverability (including g-tolerance), speed, and range in order to consummate an intercept. Their long range and speed also allow them to hold a target at risk from a much broader threat sector, which makes the problem that much harder for an interceptor. Finally, their signature is much lower and in a different part of the infra red spectrum than other weapons, so they are harder to detect.
There is a lot of work ongoing to overcome these challenges. Detection capability will require a whole new class of satellites. In my view, airborne platforms with defensive weapons are probably not the answer, unless they can remain airborne for long periods of time. Improved surface-based long-range kinetic weapons will probably be part of the solution. Space-based weapons could also be a factor. In the end, I believe directed energy will have to come into play, and if effective could quickly negate some of the kinematic advantages (i.e. time, velocity, displacement) that hypersonic weapons currently maintain.
