Editor’s Note: As many of Orbis’ readers will recall, we published Dr. Priebe’s commentary on the Trump Administration’s NATO 3.0 strategy ahead of the NATO Summit this past July. We asked Dr. Priebe to reflect on her thinking and offer a update of events during the Ankara meetings and subsequently. This post-script captures events through October 27, 2026.
In July, I argued that the core elements of NATO 3.0 – continued transatlantic partnership, a reduced US security role in Europe, allies taking the lead on regional security, and an attempt to stabilize NATO-Russia ties – serve US interests. I also argued that actual retrenchment had been modest and that several US policies were delaying or undercutting NATO 3.0’s goals. Pressuring allies to make territorial concessions, interfering in allies’ domestic politics, imposing tariffs on the EU and UK, and launching another war in the Middle East were eroding perceptions of shared transatlantic interests, complicating European rearmament, undermining European unity, and delaying US posture changes. Since July, there have been some positive developments, but tensions remain between the administration’s vision for NATO 3.0 and its other foreign policy priorities.
“Since July, there have been some positive developments, but tensions remain between the administration’s vision for NATO 3.0 and its other foreign policy priorities.”
There have been some steps in the right direction. Most notably, the US Department of War’s Europe posture review is underway, with decisions expected by the end of the year.[1] The department is reportedly considering options to cut 25,000 or 40,000 personnel from the region (out of roughly 80,000), the kind of significant reductions that NATO 3.0 envisions.[2]
The department also appears to be laying some groundwork with Congress for a significant reduction in U.S. presence. The Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act required, among other things, that both the Secretary of War and the EUCOM commander separately certify that any proposed reduction is in the US national interest and followed consultation with allies.[3] The Senate’s and House’s defense authorization bills for Fiscal Year 2027 include similar provisions, so future funding will likely carry similar requirements prior to substantial reductions in US presence in Europe.[4] In a speech to the North Atlantic Council, Undersecretary of War for Policy Colby highlighted parts of the posture review process that appear to facilitate such certifications, including EUCOM’s central role in the assessment and the department’s solicitation of information from allies.[5]
The United States has also dropped demands for control of Greenland. President Trump was still making the demands in July at the Ankara summit. [6] But the United States subsequently reached an agreement with Denmark and Greenland that expands US military access and excludes US rivals without transferring sovereignty.[7] The agreement is unlikely to erase allies’ concerns about US use of coercion in an attempt to obtain an ally’s territory. But defusing an active dispute is a first step toward rebuilding a perception of shared interest in European stability that NATO 3.0 requires.
Meanwhile, the United States has continued to prioritize foreign policy goals that undermine progress toward NATO 3.0 and sometimes run counter to it. For example, United States and Israel are reportedly preparing to resume large-scale strikes on Iran that will likely involve US forces based in Europe, which runs counter to NATO 3.0’s goal of reducing US presence in the region.[8] Moreover, the ongoing conflict continues to drag on European economies, making it harder for allies to meet the NATO defense spending targets.[9]
“The ongoing conflict [in Iran] continues to drag on European economies, making it harder for allies to meet the NATO defense spending targets.”
The administration has also continued to use threats of tariffs and posture changes to reward and punish individual allies in pursuit of other foreign policy objectives. At the July summit, President Trump complained about allies who had not supported US operations against Iran and threatened to punish Spain by cutting off trade.[10] The questionnaire sent to allies as part of the Department of War’s posture review reportedly asks whether they have supported US policies in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere and whether they are buying American-made weapons. Some allies have interpreted this as a sign that the United States is settling into a transactional approach.[11] Consistent with this view, the administration appears poised to reward Poland – which the administration has called a “model ally”[12] – with a permanent base, even though NATO 3.0’s goal of shifting primary responsibility for defense to allies would be better served by moving US forces out of frontline states.[13] Allies are likely to respond differently to Washington using US presence and commitments to reward and punish individual allies. Some, like Poland, may prioritize pleasing Washington over deepening European cooperation. Others, like France, are more likely to double down on seeking greater autonomy. Such divergence could, in turn, undermine the European cooperation needed to strengthen allies’ collective military capabilities.[14]
US policy toward Russia and Ukraine also shows a tension between competing objectives. Consistent with NATO 3.0’s aim of stabilizing NATO-Russia ties, the United States launched an effort to restart ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine, with a meeting expected in November.[15] But another priority, addressing voters’ concerns about energy prices before the US elections, has also shaped US policy toward the belligerents. For example, the administration concluded a deal to buy diesel from Moscow[16] and President Trump issued an executive order exempting Russia from new sanctions measures under the Lindsay O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026.[17] The administration has reportedly argued that such unilateral concessions will show Russia the economic benefits that peace could bring.[18] But continuing down this path could have two negative effects for NATO 3.0 and for other US interests. First, the United States could lose leverage to pressure Russia into a ceasefire. Without that leverage, reaching a deal would take longer. And a ceasefire could do more than short-term measures to sustainably lower energy prices. Second, a sustained policy of unilateral concessions to Russia while the war continues would likely convince allies that their interests fundamentally differ from Washington’s. In turn, allies might then weaken their economic, technological, and security cooperation with the United States over time, as my original commentary described.
“A sustained policy of unilateral concessions to Russia while the war continues would likely convince allies that their interests fundamentally differ from Washington’s.”
In sum, there have been some promising developments since July, but there are still tensions in the US approach. Going forward, the administration should prioritize a serious and coordinated posture review and diplomacy on Ukraine . In upcoming talks with Russia and Ukraine, US diplomacy should focus on provisions most likely to produce a durable ceasefire as outlined in the original commentary and use the offer of concessions (e.g., sanctions relief) in exchange for Russian acceptance of such terms. And Europe posture decisions this winter should be focused on rebalancing US resources to meet changing global threats, not on increasing leverage over individual allies to advance secondary US interests. The posture review, or follow-on initiatives, should include a long-term drawdown plan, associated force structure changes, and a process to coordinate implementation with allies. These steps would advance the administration’s vision for NATO 3.0 and put the United States on a path to rebalance its resources to reflect current threats.